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Abstract
As economic internationalization advances, the question of how firms cope with 
increasing pressure for competitiveness gains momentum. While scholars agree 
that firms need a competitive advantage, they debate whether firms exploit the 
comparative advantage of their economy and converge on that strategy facilitated by 
national institutions. “No,” argue strategic management proponents of the resource-
based view. “Yes,” claim contributors to the competitiveness literature. My micro-
level studies of these opposing views show that firms within one economy do not 
converge on the institutionally supported strategy. The discrepancies between these 
findings and the analyses of the competitiveness literature are attributed to differences 
in the indicators employed to measure corporate strategies. Whenever macro-level 
indicators are used, the related loss of information on micro-level variety entails 
that convergence effects are more pronounced – possibly exaggerated.
Zusammenfassung
Mit voranschreitender Internationalisierung von Wirtschaftsbeziehungen gewinnt die 
Frage an Bedeutung, wie Unternehmen mit steigendem Wettbewerbsdruck umgehen. 
Zwar stimmen Wissenschaftler überein, dass Firmen eines Wettbewerbsvorsprungs 
bedürfen. Doch herrscht Uneinigkeit darüber, ob Unternehmen dazu den 
komparativen Vorteil ihres Landes nutzen und sich auf die institutionell geförderte 
Strategie stützen. „Nein“, argumentieren Managementstrategen als Vertreter der 
marktorientierten Sichtweise. „Ja“, halten Anhänger der Wettbewerbsliteratur 
dagegen. Die von mir vorgeschlagenen Mikroanalysen zeigen, dass sich Unternehmen 
innerhalb eines Landes nicht auf die institutionell geförderte Wettbewerbsstrategie 
spezialisieren. Unterschiede zwischen meinen Ergebnissen und denen der 
Wettbewerbsliteratur führe ich auf die unterschiedlichen Indikatoren zurück, mit 
denen Unternehmensstrategien ermittelt werden. Immer wenn Makroindikatoren 
verwendet werden, führt der damit einhergehende Informationsverlust bezüglich 
der Vielfalt von Unternehmen auf der Mikroebene dazu, dass die Spezialisierung in 
derselben Strategie betont – vielleicht überschätzt – wird.
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Introduction
How do firms adapt to the pressures of increasing international competition? Do they 
exploit the comparative advantage offered by national institutions1 and converge 
on the facilitated competitive strategy? Agreement is broad among scholars of 
competitiveness that firms need a sustainable competitive advantage if they want to 
succeed in their business in the long run. Firms need to pursue a strategy through 
which they achieve superior performance to their competitors by offering special 
value to customers (Kogut 1985; Porter 1985; Barney 1991: 102–103; Teece et 
al. 1997; Walker 2003: 17–18). Customer value can be provided in the form of an 
entirely new, an improved, or a low-cost product (Porter 1985; Grant 1998: part III; 
Hall and Soskice 2001a: 36–44; Walker 2003: 20–34, see also section 2.1).
However, disagreement concerns the question of whether firms should use the 
comparative advantage of their institutional environment as the main source of 
competitive advantage. Should firms choose their competitive strategy in line 
with national institutions? “No,” argue advocates of the “resource-based view” 
(henceforth RBV). Firms need to exploit their individual resources in order to 
distinguish themselves from competitors. Only if they use their exclusive capabilities 
can firms gain competitive advantage and implement a value-creating strategy not 
imitated by their rivals (e.g. Rumelt 1984; Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991; Conner 
1991; Peteraf 1993; Barney and Clark 2007; Newbert 2007).
“Yes,” claim proponents of the convergence argument2 – including scholars 
of classical and neoliberal trade theory,3 the market-based view within strategic 
management studies,4 the literature on national innovation systems,5 and the 
varieties-of-capitalism literature.6 Since national institutions provide specific types 
of input factors – most importantly finance and labor qualifications – which, in turn, 
facilitate specific strategies, firms maximize their competitiveness if they choose 
the particular strategy supported by national institutions.
This article seeks to assess the two opposing arguments by asking: Do firms within 
one economy converge on the same competitive strategy? To answer this question, 
1 In line with Streeck and Thelen (2005: 9–16), I understand institutions as “formalized rules that 
may be enforced by calling upon a third party” (Streeck/Thelen 2005: 10).
2 It should be noted that the term “convergence” is understood here more from a strategic man-
agement perspective than a political economic one. More concretely, it means that the plurality 
or majority of firms within one economy pursue, or specialize in, the same competitive strategy. 
It is thus not to be understood in the sense of the convergence debate of political economy stud-
ies which analyze convergence effects across economies.
3 See, for example Heckscher (1919); Ohlin (1933); Lindbeck/Snower (2001); Sinn (2005).
4 Porter (1987, 1990) is to be named as the most important proponent of this view.
5 See Pavitt/Patel (1999); Lundvall/Maskell (2000); Casper/Matraves (2003); Casper/Whitley 
(2004).
6 See in particular Hall/Soskice (2001b); Amable (2003); Hancké/Herrmann (2007).
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the strategies of pharmaceutical firms in the UK, Germany, and Italy are identified.7 
Here, my analysis differs from most competitiveness studies in that the latter 
measure competitive strategies mostly through macro-level indicators, i.e. by using 
a firm’s industry as a proxy for its strategy. For example, they interpret participation 
in an innovative industry as an indicator of firms pursuing an innovative strategy, 
while participation in a non-innovative industry is taken as an indicator of firms 
pursuing a non-innovative strategy. Contrary to these conventional approaches, 
strategies are identified here at the micro level, i.e. by considering the technology 
intensity of pharmaceutical firms. This makes it possible to reveal how many firms 
pursue the same strategies across and within different economies. Will this micro-
level assessment support the strategy convergence argument?
While the answer, in short, is “no,” the particularly interesting aspect about this 
answer is its reason. The latter is of a methodological nature and consists in the loss 
of information that is related to the use of macro-level indicators as proxies for firms’ 
competitive strategies. Since competitiveness scholars have based their argument 
mostly on studies which use macro-level indicators, the related loss of information 
on micro-level variety explains why these studies reveal pronounced convergence 
effects. The micro-level measure employed here, combining a firm’s product novelty 
and its value-chain focus, demonstrates that variety in the pursuit of different 
strategies is more pronounced than the use of macro-level indicators can reveal.
To illustrate this argument, the remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 
1 conceptualizes competitive strategies and develops the theoretical framework, 
illustrating why we should expect strategy convergence within economies. Section 
2 develops the analytical framework: It operationalizes competitive strategies and 
suggests a novel approach to identifying strategies at the micro level. This approach 
is applied in section 3 when one of the largest pharmaceutical databases is sampled. 
Building on the insights obtained, the summary assessment of section 4 casts doubt on 
the convergence idea. Section 5 summarizes and interprets the previous findings.
7 It should be noted that I follow the commonly acknowledged definitions here and distinguish 
between a pharmaceutical firm, a biotechnology firm, a traditional pharmaceutical firm, and a 
generics firm as follows. A “pharmaceutical firm” is an umbrella term for any company that is 
active in the drugs industry, including biotechnology, traditional pharmaceutical, and generics 
firms. Consequently, a company is identified as a pharmaceutical firm on the basis of the prod-
uct it manufactures, namely a drug that cures or alleviates a disease. The distinction between 
a biotechnology firm, a traditional pharmaceutical firm, and a generics firm is however made 
on the basis of the company’s technological approach. Thus, “biotechnology firms” are said to 
employ the most modern technology as they use processes on the level of the cell and sub-cell 
to create industrially useful substances. While “traditional pharmaceutical firms” are aware of, 
and also resort to, biotechnological opportunities, they tend to use experimental and, hence, less 
deliberate approaches to drug design. Finally, “generics firms” are the least technology-intensive, 
as they do not engage in any research and clinical development activities. Instead, they imitate 
drugs as soon as their patent protection expires (see Drews 2000; Orsenigo et al. 2001; Pammolli 
et al. 2002; Muffatto/Giardina 2003; Wittner 2003).
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1 How to distinguish competitive strategies: Conceptualization and 
theoretical framework
In line with major analysts of corporate competitiveness (Porter 1980: chapter 
1; Porter 1985: chapter 1; Andrews 1987: chapter 2; Grant 1998: chapter 1; 
Walker 2003: 17–18; see also Hall/Soskice 2001a: 14–17), a competitive strategy 
is understood here as a process that translates into the development of products 
which offer unique customer value. If pursued successfully, a competitive strategy 
enables firms to achieve a competitive advantage, i.e. superior performance to their 
competitors.
The competitiveness literature distinguishes between three, inherently different 
strategies on the basis of their technology intensity. If a sustainable advantage 
arises from the development of entirely new products, being the result of a radical 
technological innovation, the developing firm is said to pursue a strategy of “radical 
product innovation.”8 If a firm competes by selling known but improved products 
as a result of an incremental technological innovation, it is found to be engaged in 
diversified quality production.9 Finally, if firms sell standardized goods, resulting 
from the imitation of an established technology, they are held to pursue a strategy 
of low cost production.10 I here follow the typology proposed by the literature and 
distinguish accordingly between radical product innovation (henceforth RPI), 
diversified quality production (henceforth DQP) and low cost production (henceforth 
LCP).
But how do RBV and competitiveness theories differ in their expectations of why 
national institutions are able – or, conversely, ought not – to bring firms within the 
same economy to converge in the pursuit of these strategies? To begin with RBV 
theory, the latter is mostly concerned with understanding how firms can use their 
individual capabilities as sources of competitive advantage. In short, RBV theory 
claims that those resources hold the potential for competitive advantage which are 
valuable, rare, hard-to-imitate, and strategically non-substitutable (Barney 1991; 
see also Rumelt 1984; Wernerfelt 1984; Conner 1991; Peteraf 1993; Barney/Clark 
2007; Newbert 2007). Following this reasoning, the comparative advantages offered 
by national institutions, e.g. the abundance of venture capital or inexpensive labor, 
can be transformed into a unique resource. However, the ubiquitous exploitation 
of such comparative institutional advantages seems incompatible with the search 
for uniqueness. How can firms build unique capabilities if they all exploit the same 
8 See Lundvall (1992a: 11–12); Lundvall (1992c: 58–59); Estevez-Abe et al. (2001: 149, 174); 
Casper (2001: 398); Hall/Soskice (2001a: 38–39).
9 See in particular Streeck (1991); see also Porter (1985: 14); Lundvall (1992a: 11–12); Lundvall 
(1992c: 57–58); Estevez-Abe et al. (2001: 148–149, 174); Casper (2001: 399–400); Hall/Soskice 
(2001a: 39).
10 Proponents are Porter (1985: 12–14); Estevez-Abe et al. (2001: 148, 175); Casper (2001: 398–
399); see also Ohlin (1924: 89); Heckscher (1919: 55–58); Sinn (2005: 18–19).
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institutional advantages? Focusing on the internal resources of firms rather than the 
impact of external contexts (see Bresser 2004: 1275), RBV theory thus suggests 
that, in order to be unique, firms within one economy should not converge in the 
pursuit of the same competitive strategy.
This is different for contributors to the competitiveness literature which goes back to 
the trade theorem of Heckscher–Ohlin (Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933) and includes 
the market-based view of strategic management studies (Porter 1980; 1985; 1990), 
theories on national innovation systems (Lundvall 1992b; Nelson 1993; Pavitt/Patel 
1999), and the literature on varieties of capitalism (Hall/Soskice 2001b; Amable 
2003; Hancké et al. 2007). Despite their different foci, all these strands agree that 
economies are differently endowed with input factors which, in turn, are required 
for particular competitive strategies. While the originators of this literature consider 
how the abundance of labor and capital influences corporate production decisions 
(Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933), its subsequent developers distinguish between 
different types of these production factors and illustrate how they are at the basis 
of RPI, DQP, and LCP strategies. Since national corporate-governance and labor-
market institutions are found to influence the availability of these crucially required 
factor types,11 the four abovementioned strands of the competitiveness literature 
furthermore concur in the claim that firms should exploit the comparative institutional 
advantages of their economy and embark on the institutionally facilitated strategy.
More concretely, the institutional environment of coordinated economies like 
Germany or Sweden is said to facilitate competition through product quality and, 
hence convergence in, DQP strategies. Collective bargaining procedures between 
the social partners do not simply entail comparatively high and homogeneous wages; 
they also facilitate an education and training system that provides employees with 
highly specific vocational skills. The latter are at the root of extraordinary labor 
productivity and high-value added strategies. Since the corporate governance system 
grants shareholders important control rights, managers cannot take major financial 
decisions at short notice, which is necessary to rapidly invest in, or divest from, 
radically innovative projects. Yet, firms have access to “patient” capital, required 
for incrementally innovative projects, because major stakeholders – such as banks, 
suppliers, employees, or the founding family – also tend to be major shareholders. 
Cooperation enhancing labor-market institutions and corporate-governance 
systems thus constitute important comparative advantages for the pursuit of DQP 
strategies.12
11 The reason why finance and labor are perceived as crucial is that – contrary to, say, raw materials 
– firms cannot secure them on their own but only after the successful solution of a coordination 
problem with their financiers and employees (Hall/Soskice 2001a: 6–7; see also Andersen 1992: 
68–69; Lundvall 1992a: 13–15; Patel/Pavitt 1994: 91–92; Hollingsworth 2000: 626–630).
12 Proponents are, in particular, Porter (1990: 355–382); Pavitt/Patel (1999); Hollingsworth (2000); 
Estevez-Abe et al. (2001); Hall/Soskice (2001a: 36–44); Vitols (2001); Amable (2003); Casper/
Matraves (2003); Casper/Whitley (2004); Sinn (2005); see also Christensen (1992); Freeman 
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The opposite applies to liberal economies like the UK or the US, where the institutional 
setting is found to motivate competition through RPI strategies. Since collective 
bargaining processes are decentralized, it is difficult to put in place an education and 
training system where firms collaborate to provide trainees with specific skills. But, 
wages are flexible. High bonuses can therefore be paid to motivate employees to 
relentlessly develop radically new innovations. Furthermore, deregulated financial 
markets give firms easy access to share capital. This, however, needs to be invested 
in (radical innovation) projects promising high returns in the short run because, if 
the profit expectations of shareholders are not fulfilled, the latter rapidly withdraw 
funds as they have only reduced monitoring possibilities to understand how their 
investment is used. Flexible labor markets and deregulated corporate governance 
systems thus seem to offer compelling comparative advantages for the pursuit of 
RPI strategies.13
Finally, firms in – what I term here – low investment economies, such as Italy, 
Spain, or Greece, are likely to converge in the pursuit of LCP strategies. Where 
labor-market institutions allow for comparatively low wage levels, employers are 
unlikely to participate in sophisticated education and training programs, while 
employees, once they have finished compulsory schooling, often decide to start 
working rather than invest in further education. Whenever opportunities for low 
wage levels are coupled with nontransparent financial-market institutions, firms 
are all the more likely to engage in LCP as share capital and bank credit, required 
for radical and incremental innovation alike, are difficult to obtain. Firms in low 
investment economies seem thus best advised to exploit the cost advantage of the 
economy and converge on LCP strategies.14
Contrary to their RBV colleagues, competitiveness scholars thus argue that 
comparative institutional advantages are an important source of competitive 
advantage. With increasing competitive pressure, firms are therefore expected to 
gain competitiveness by exploiting these comparative institutional advantages and 
pursuing the facilitated strategies. To gain a better understanding of how economic 
internationalization impacts on corporate strategy choices, the remainder of this 
article attempts to test the idea of strategy convergence. Does a plurality, or even the 
majority, of firms within one economy pursue the same competitive strategies?
(1992); Keck (1993).
13 See in particular Porter (1990: 482–507); Pavitt/Patel (1999); Estevez-Abe et al. (2001); Hall/
Soskice (2001a: 36–44); Vitols (2001); Amable (2003); Casper/Matraves (2003); Casper/Whitley 
(2004); see also Christensen (1992); Freeman (1992); Walker (1993); Hollingsworth (2000).
14 See Estevez-Abe et al. (2001: 175–176); Amable (2003: in particular 102–114, 197–213); see also 
Porter (1990: 421–453); Malerba (1993); King/Wood (1999: 376); Trento (2005).
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2 How to distinguish competitive strategies: Operationalization and 
analytical framework
When consulting the literature for advice on how to measure strategy convergence, 
two peculiarities are striking. First, competitiveness scholars hardly provide reference 
points for assessing convergence patterns within one economy. They usually take 
the “revealed comparative advantage” as an indicator of strategy convergence, 
which compares, for a certain industry, the export performance of one economy 
relative to the export performance of a reference group of countries. If firms in this 
economy export more than firms of the reference group, the former are said to have 
specialized in, or converged on, the production of the studied industry’s goods.15 
Standardized measures of patent registrations or citations are used as an alternative 
measure of relative strategy convergence.16 But do all, the absolute majority, or 
simply a plurality of firms within one industry of one country need to pursue the 
same strategy in order to constitute empirical instances of convergence effects?
These measures entail a second peculiarity. Strategy convergence is systematically 
assessed through macro characteristics of firms. That is, firms are attributed 
a strategy on the basis of the industry in which they are active. The finding that 
specific high, medium, or low-tech industries are more developed in one economy 
than in others is cited as empirical proof of the idea that firms in this economy 
have converged on high, medium, or low-innovation strategies respectively. But 
whenever the technology intensity of entire industries is taken as a proxy for 
competitive strategies, this entails the simplifying assumption that all firms of this 
industry pursue the same strategy (Rumelt 1984: 559–560; Barney 1991: 100). Yet, 
is it not more plausible to assume that firms can pursue different strategies?
A noteworthy exception to the identification of relative convergence patterns at 
the industry level is provided by innovation studies which compare the absolute 
development of “market segments” (Casper et al. 1999) or “sub-sectors” (Casper/
Soskice 2004; Casper/Whitley 2004) within the biotech industry. These studies 
suggest that biotech firms developing therapeutics pursue a radical innovation 
strategy, as this market segment is characterized by discrete technological innovation. 
On the other hand, firms in the market segment of platform technologies are said to 
engage in diversified quality strategy, since this segment is particularly susceptible 
to “cumulative or incremental patterns of technical change” (Casper/Soskice 2004: 
368; see also Casper et al. 1999: 15). Mostly based on studies of the late 1990s, 
the share of radically innovative therapeutics firms is found to be above average 
in the UK, whereas the percentage of incrementally innovative platform providers 
15 For examples, see Fagerberg (1992); Dalum (1992); Keck (1993: 133–137); Hancké/Herrmann 
(2007); see also Porter (1990: 179–541); Amable (2003: 200–209); Sinn (2005).
16 See Chesnais (1993: 220–226); Walker (1993: 168–169); Pavitt/Patel (1999); Estevez-Abe et al. 
(2001: 174–176); Hall/Soskice (2001a: 36–44); also Amable (2003: 200–209).
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is above average in Germany (Casper et al. 1999: 20–21; Casper/Soskice 2004: 
365–366; Casper/Whitley 2004: 98).
However, two difficulties are related to identifying strategies of biotech firms via 
their industrial sub-sector. First, any young biotech industry is characterized by a 
high proportion of platform-technology providers. Since it now takes almost 15 
years to turn a pharmaceutical discovery into a profitable drug (Muffatto/Giardina 
2003: 109), many young biotech start-ups which ultimately aim at developing a 
therapeutic product (have to) commercialize their knowledge by providing platform 
technologies. But this usually is a temporary way of securing finance, rather than 
a strategy in itself (Freyberg 2004). Once providers of platform services have 
developed their discovery far enough to acquire venture capital, they often turn into 
dedicated therapeutics firms. With the increasing maturity of a country’s biotech 
industry, the share of platform-technology firms decreases and convergence patterns 
disappear – as occurs in Germany, too (Ernst & Young 2005: 65, 2006: 47). Second, 
“platform-technology firms create the research tools used in therapeutics” (Casper et 
al. 1999: 21). In other words, they are service providers, whereas therapeutics firms 
seek to develop products (Freyberg 2004). Since the provision of services might 
follow a different operational logic than manufacturing activities, it seems risky to 
compare firms of the secondary and tertiary sector. Differences in the organizational 
structure might be a consequence of special sectoral requirements rather than of 
particular strategies.
To identify corporate strategies across and within different economies, I therefore 
decided to combine two micro-level indicators: the technological novelty of a firm’s 
products, and its value-chain focus. To this end, the study of the pharmaceuticals 
industry seems particularly promising as competitive strategies can be identified 
in a straightforward way due to the scientifically established notion of a “new 
chemical entity” (henceforth NCE). An NCE constitutes a chemical entity which has 
not previously been discovered. It is scientific practice to indicate whether active 
ingredients or excipients of a pharmaceutical product are NCEs, modifications of 
already discovered entities, or mere imitations.17 Accordingly, patent-protected 
pharmaceuticals can take one of two forms. They may be radically new, as they are 
based on an NCE, or they may be incrementally new in that they introduce slight 
changes to already discovered chemical entities which improve the drugs’ efficiency. 
For example, undesired side effects are limited, or the frequency or quantity with 
which a drug has to be consumed is reduced. Yet not all pharmaceutical companies 
engage in research and development (henceforth R&D) activities. As soon as patent 
protection expires, (generics) firms compete by imitating a product’s excipients or 
active compounds so as to sell the imitated drug at the lowest possible price (see 
17 For a better understanding, it should be noted that active ingredients are those compounds in a 
pharmaceutical preparation that exert a pharmacological effect, whereas excipients are inactive 
substances used as carriers for the active ingredients of a medication.
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Wittner 2003). Using this classification, I propose the following differentiation 
between competitive strategies (see Bottazzi et al. 2001: 1162–1167). Pharmaceutical 
firms inventing drugs based on NCEs pursue an RPI strategy, whereas firms 
improving already discovered chemical entities compete through DQP. Firms which 
do not engage in R&D, but focus on imitating innovations made by others, pursue 
an LCP strategy.
The PHID database, one of the largest pharmaceutical databases worldwide, allows 
the identification of a firm’s competitive strategy via the chemical entities employed 
in that firm’s drugs.18 Developed by a group of researchers at the University of 
Siena, the PHID database keeps track of 16751 pharmaceutical projects carried 
out by 3522 firms and public research organizations in 7 countries.19, 20 The latter 
include Germany, Italy, and the UK, in addition to France, Japan, Switzerland, and 
the USA.21 It should furthermore be noted that a pharmaceutical firm is included in 
the PHID database once it has been involved in at least one pharmaceutical project 
which has reached the stage of preclinical development since the 1980s. Even firms 
whose pharmaceutical projects have not been granted patent protection are thus 
recorded. Only (generics) companies which abstain from traditional R&D activities 
are not considered in the database. Furthermore, and importantly for the aim of 
this study, pharmaceutical firms are considered only if their projects translate(d) 
into therapeutic drugs curing or alleviating human diseases. Providers of platform 
technologies active in the service sector are not included. The comparison of firms 
in the manufacturing and service sector is thus avoided (see Casper et al. 1999; 
Casper/Soskice 2004; Casper/Whitley 2004).
In addition to the novelty of chemical entities, the PHID database contains a second 
micro-level measure which allows the identification of a firm’s strategy: its value-
chain focus. The latter can be derived from the database’s classification of firms 
as developers, licensors, and licensees. To understand these terms, it is important 
to note that the pharmaceutical industry is characterized by a remarkable division 
of labor (see Gambardella et al. 2001: 36–53). Any drug that is sold on the market 
must have passed through three major stages. The first is the research stage (drug 
discovery and preclinical development), during which a firm discovers how a 
chemical entity interacts with other molecules in such a way that a curative effect 
can be obtained. The second, namely the development stage, consists in turning this 
discovery into a pharmaceutical product. During the phases of clinical development 
I, II, and III, a firm experiments with the form and dosage in which the drug should 
18 An overview of the database’s population, the sampling strategy employed, and possible sam-
pling biases is provided in the technical appendix.
19 A firm is defined as a legal entity, and its nationality is determined by the location of its head-
quarters.
20 Since this database is constantly updated, these figures refer to November 2004.
21 To be precise, the PHID database covers 67 countries. However, the number of pharmaceutical 
projects considered in the other 60 countries is too limited to provide representative results.
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be administered. Furthermore, undesired side effects are recorded and, if possible, 
reduced or eliminated. Finally, any relevant information regarding both the drug’s 
features and its production process are documented in the third stage, i.e. the 
registration stage. This documentation is then handed to the responsible national or 
international authorities in order to obtain a marketing authorization (see Muffatto/
Giardina 2003: 112–116; Drews 1999: 117–154).
The researchers administering the PHID database show that these three stages are 
often not carried out by the same firm. Instead, pharmaceutical companies tend 
to divide labor, and specialize in upstream, midstream, or downstream activities 
(see Orsenigo et al. 2001; Bottazzi et al. 2001; Owen-Smith et al. 2002; Pammolli 
et al. 2002). Interestingly, the division of labor is not only pronounced between 
innovative pharmaceutical firms on the one hand and generics firms on the other 
(see Pammolli et al. 2002). It also importantly takes place between innovative firms 
(see Orsenigo et al. 2001; Bottazzi et al. 2001; Owen-Smith et al. 2002).
The latter division of labor is reported in the PHID database by the previously 
mentioned distinction between developers, licensors, and licensees. A developer is a 
firm with a fully integrated value chain, as it carries out all stages on its own. A drug 
is thus discovered, developed, and registered by the same firm. A licensor, on the 
other hand, initiates a project which ultimately translates into a new drug. However, 
focusing on the research stage (i.e. on discovery and preclinical development), the 
licensor decides at a certain point to out-license its discovery to another firm, which 
continues the clinical development and registration process. Accordingly, a licensee 
focuses on the stages of (late) clinical development and registration in order to 
translate the respective discovery into a marketable drug. Using this distinction, the 
Italian researchers show that biotech firms tend to be licensors, whereas traditional 
pharmaceutical firms are often licensees (Orsenigo et al. 2001). Figure 1 provides 
an overview of the division of labor in the pharmaceutical industry.
Combining information on product novelty and value-chain focus makes it possible 
to identify radical product innovators, diversified quality producers, and low cost 
producers as follows.
A firm pursues an RPI strategy whenever it is the developer or licensor of a 
pharmaceutical project which translates into a drug based on an NCE. Since the 
discovery of the NCE is made by the licensor, the latter is radically innovative 
irrespective of whether the licensing agreement is made at the development or the 
registration stage of a pharmaceutical project.
Following this logic, a firm pursues a DQP strategy whenever it develops or 
out-licenses a project that improves a previously discovered chemical entity. In 
addition to this, a firm also pursues a DQP strategy if it in-licenses a pharmaceutical 
project based on an NCE at the stage of clinical development. At this moment, the 
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previously unknown chemical entity has been discovered so that it is the task of the 
licensee to improve the chemical entity such as to optimize its effectiveness and 
dosage. Hence, both licensees of a clinical development agreement and developers 
or licensors of an improved drug pursue a DQP strategy, as they are not radically 
but incrementally innovative.
This leaves us with a third group of firms that conclude in-licensing agreements 
with the purpose of registering and marketing both radically or incrementally new 
drugs. Interestingly, these firms concur with generics firms in that both abstain from 
engaging in expensive R&D activities. Instead, their strategy consists in producing 
and selling drugs at the lowest possible costs.
3 Do firms in Germany, Italy, and the UK converge on the same strategy?
Will this micro-level approach to identifying competitive strategies provide 
empirical support for the idea that firms use the comparative institutional advantages 
of their economy and converge on the facilitated strategy? To answer this question, 
it is first necessary to decide which countries to include in the analyses. From the 
Figure 1 Labor Division in the Pharmaceutical Industry
Source: Own illustration based on the work of Gambardella et al. (2001), Orsenigo et al. (2001), 
and Pammolli et al. (2002).
Research
(Discovery and preclinical 
development)
Biotech firms
Traditional
pharmaceutical firms
Generics firms
Development
(Clinical development: 
Phases I, II, III)
Registration
(Registration, marketing,
post-clinical surveillance
Value Chain
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perspective of the competitiveness literature, those countries should be selected 
which offer the most ideal institutional environment for the pursuit of RPI, DQP, 
and LCP strategies respectively. However, as illustrated in a particularly exhaustive 
manner by contributors to the market-based view (most notably, Porter 1990), 
the external factors that can affect the strategy choices of firms often exceed an 
economy’s institutions. In the pharmaceutical sector, these non-institutional factors 
include, most importantly, patent legislation, legal price ceilings on pharmaceutical 
products, and legislative requirements for the quality, safety, and efficacy of 
medicines. Where patent legislation is lax, where price ceilings are low, and where 
legislative requirements for pharmaceutical quality, safety, and efficacy are notably 
different from those of other countries, firms are discouraged to engage in R&D and, 
hence, in RPI or DQP strategies (Gambardella et al. 2001; Wittner 2003; Thomas 
III 2004).
To control for these factors which influence strategy choices other than those 
institutions retained as essential by the competitiveness literature, a comparison 
of EU member states seems particularly appropriate. Following the Maastricht 
treaty of December 1991, the single market project was fostered not only through 
the harmonization of national competition law, but also through the establishment 
of coordinating agencies at the European level. In the pharmaceutical sector, the 
foundation of the European Medicines Agency in 1995 ensured that the evaluation 
and supervision of the quality, safety, and efficacy of medicines is today homogeneous 
across the EU. Similarly, the European Patent Office guarantees that pharmaceutical 
inventions enjoy the same protection in all EU member states (Gambardella et al. 
2001; Casper/Matraves 2003: 1868; Wittner 2003; EMEA 2006). Pharmaceutical 
firms within the EU member states thus face very similar legislative requirements, 
which can therefore be excluded as determinants of corporate strategy choices.
Interestingly, though, national corporate-governance and labor-market institutions 
continue to be of strikingly different shapes, even in those countries that make up 
part of the European Union (Hall/Soskice 2001a: 51–54). To test the competitiveness 
literature’s argument, it is thus advisable to compare those EU member states which 
are most different from each other in their corporate-governance and labor-market 
institutions, thereby offering ideal environments for the pursuit of RPI, DQP, and 
LCP strategies respectively. Across the competitiveness literature, agreement 
is broad that – among the EU member states for which PHID data is available 
– these countries are the UK, Germany, and Italy. As illustrated in section 1, the 
deregulated labor market and flexible corporate-governance system of the UK 
encourages outstanding employee performance and the provision of seed (venture) 
capital required for RPI. The coordinating institutions of the German economy, by 
contrast, support DQP as they motivate employees to invest in highly specific skills, 
and financiers to provide ‘patient’ capital to firms. Finally, Italy’s comparatively 
low wage levels and relationship-based provision of finance are said to be at the 
basis of LCP strategies.
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So, do British firms mostly engage in RPI, whereas German companies converge on 
DQP, while their Italian counterparts prefer the pursuit of an LCP strategy? Tables 1 
to 3 summarize the results obtained from sampling the PHID database. Given that it 
takes on average 14 years to develop a pharmaceutical product (Muffatto/Giardina 
2003: 108–109), the sample has been limited to the last 20 years in order to cover 
a sufficiently long time span, while eliminating outdated results. Accordingly, only 
those firms were considered which have been involved in the advancement of at 
least one pharmaceutical project since 1985.
The most important finding for the question of strategy convergence is that the 
obtained strategy patterns of firms are very similar for the UK, Germany, and Italy. 
Since a considerable number of radical product innovators, diversified quality 
producers, and low cost producers can be found in the UK, Germany, and Italy 
alike, strong convergence effects cannot be assessed.
Regarding the sample size, it is noteworthy that the British sample is slightly larger, 
as comparatively few biotech firms are included in the German sample, and hardly 
any in the Italian sample. The reason for this is the difference in age of the British, 
German, and Italian biotech industries. While this industry began to crystallize in 
Britain in the 1980s (see Ernst & Young 2003; Thomson Financial 2004), most 
biotech firms in Germany were founded in the mid- and late 1990s (ibid., see also 
Hinze et al. 2001: 18–24). Italian biotech firms are even younger, as they were 
mostly founded around the turn of the millennium (Chiesa 2004: 10–18; Pozzali 
2004; Vingiani 2006). Therefore, many successful biotech firms in Germany and 
Italy today had not yet, or had only just recently, brought a pharmaceutical project 
beyond the stage of preclinical development and were thus not included in the PHID 
database when I sampled the latter in November 2004. This explains the smaller 
size of the German and Italian sample.
Interestingly, though, these age differences do not lead to differences in the share of 
firms pursuing an RPI strategy. Accordingly, tables 1 to 3 illustrate how labor division 
in Britain takes place between biotechnology and traditional pharmaceutical firms. 
In Germany and Italy, by contrast, the lower number of biotech firms means that 
labor division is more pronounced within the traditional pharmaceutical industry, 
namely between (small) research-oriented and (large) development-oriented firms 
(see also Gambardella et al. 2001: 45).
A more in-depth interpretation of the results reported in tables 1 to 3 allows us to 
classify firms with regard to the competitive strategy they pursue. The most clear-
cut distinction between competitive strategies can be made between non-innovative 
low cost producers on the one hand and innovation-driven pharmaceutical firms 
on the other. As mentioned above, generics firms are not included in the PHID 
database and, consequently, in any of the three samples, as they do not engage in 
R&D activities. Imitating a once patent-protected drug, generics producers are not 
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legally obliged to perform clinical trials as long as they can demonstrate that the 
imitated drug is bioequivalent to the original pharmaceutical. Avoiding the extremely 
expensive stages of clinical development is precisely what allows generics firms to 
produce and market drugs at low prices. The absence of any generics firm from the 
sample thus shows that this category of firm does indeed pursue an LCP strategy.
A second group of low cost producers consists in those firms that specialize in 
the registration phase of pharmaceutical products. In addition to these marketing 
specialists, several pharmaceutical firms conclude marketing agreements at the 
registration stage, even though they are also active in R&D. It is noteworthy that 
these seemingly ambiguous cases are almost exclusively constituted by large, 
internationally active firms with an extensive product range. In these cases, the in-
licensing of pharmaceutical products does not constitute a competitive strategy in 
itself, driven by technological considerations. It is rather a commercial tool to grant 
partner firms access to the home market in order to secure their own international 
presence. Since these pharmaceutical firms do not pursue a genuine LCP strategy, 
only the pure marketing specialists are counted as low cost producers.
Among the pharmaceutical firms which are active in R&D, the distinction between 
radical product innovators, on the one hand, and diversified quality producers, on 
the other, requires particular attention. While one group of pure diversified quality 
producers which in-license pharmaceutical projects at the development stage can 
be unambiguously recognized, the identification of pure radical product innovators 
is more difficult.
Interestingly, not a single firm exists that merely develops or out-licenses pharma-
ceutical products based on an NCE. The reason for this resides in the unpredictability 
of radical pharmaceutical innovation. As in any research project, the chance element 
involved in pharmaceutical research is high (Muffatto/Giardina 2003: 111). Hence, 
a pharmaceutical firm cannot be sure that it will discover an NCE. It can make 
every possible effort, yet it may ultimately end up using its research outcomes for 
improving an already known chemical entity. The discovery of an NCE is therefore 
by far less frequent than the improvement of a known chemical entity (Bottazzi et 
al. 2001: 1163). However, a pharmaceutical firm can decide to focus on the research 
stage, i.e. on the discovery and preclinical development of pharmaceutical projects, 
in that it out-licenses their development and registration. Accordingly, licensors of 
both NCE and non-NCE projects are more innovative than their licensees. All 
pharmaceutical firms which have (developed and/or) out-licensed at least one 
pharmaceutical project based on an NCE are therefore classified as radical product 
innovators because they are discoverers of NCEs with a strong propensity to out-
license downstream activities, i.e. clinical development and registration.
This leaves us with a group of ambiguous cases. It is composed of those firms which are 
either pure licensors of already discovered chemical entities or developers of known 
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chemical entities that were in-licensed at the research stage from public research 
organizations (henceforth PROs), namely universities or research institutes. On the 
one hand, these firms are not particularly innovative as the resulting drugs are based 
on known chemical entities. On the other hand, they are innovative as the licensors 
focus on the research stage of a pharmaceutical project. Similarly, the developers of 
this group have a research focus, as they collaborate closely with PROs from which 
they in-licensed pharmaceutical projects before the development stage. Since it 
has not been possible to classify them purely on the basis of their involvement 
in the different stages of pharmaceutical projects, I have consulted their websites 
and asked representatives of these firms about their companies’ strategies. These 
additional sources of information reveal that the respective firms are ‘ambiguous 
cases’ to the extent that they are unclear about whether their innovative potential 
suffices to engage in, or respectively focus on, upstream research activities so as 
to embark on RPI strategies in the long run. Seeking to balance the firms’ quest for 
radical innovativeness and their as yet limited success in advancing NCE projects, 
I have categorized these firms on the basis of their technological approach. I have 
thus classified all biotechnology firms as radical product innovators, because they 
use modern approaches of molecular biology and genomic sciences, which, in turn, 
enable a more deliberate drug design. On the other hand, traditional pharmaceutical 
firms using experimental approaches to drug design (see Drews 2000) are classified 
as diversified quality producers.
Another, partly similar, group of firms can be identified. It is similar to the group 
of ambiguous cases in that firms are either developers and/or licensors of already 
discovered chemical entities. However, unlike the ambiguous cases, these firms do 
not in-license pharmaceutical projects at the research but at the development stage. 
This, in turn, suggests that they are more incrementally than radically innovative. 
Accordingly, they are classified as diversified quality producers. In addition, all 
those firms which are exclusive developers of pharmaceutical products based on 
known chemical entities are also categorized as diversified quality producers.
Finally, the last group of cases consists of those pharmaceutical firms which 
pursue both an RPI and a DQP strategy. On the one hand, they are radical product 
innovators, as they out-license (and develop) pharmaceutical products based on 
NCEs. On the other hand, these firms also pursue a DQP strategy by developing drugs 
based on previously discovered chemical entities, or by in-licensing pharmaceutical 
projects at the development stage. Interestingly, this group of firms consists almost 
exclusively of the industry’s international giants. Interviews with representatives, 
and webpage analyses, of these RPI/DQP firms reveal that the latter usually embed 
each strategy in a separate business unit. From an operational point of view, these 
units are independent as they encompass all departments necessary for discovering, 
developing, and producing drugs. Accordingly, interviewees repeatedly described 
the RPI and DQP units as organizationally separate entities, which are only 
interdependent insofar as they are financed by the same holding company. From 
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a transaction-cost perspective, this interdependence seems to be explained by 
accounting practices. Given that the development of radically and incrementally 
new drugs is both risky and extremely expensive, losses of one business unit can 
be balanced by the profits of the other unit (see also Drews 1999). Despite this 
financial interdependence, I decided to adopt the view of my interviewees that one 
RPI/DQP firm does not pursue two different competitive strategies, but that two 
different business units belonging to one holding company pursue one competitive 
strategy apiece. I have therefore classified each of these firms as two cases: one 
radical product innovator and one diversified quality producer.
In sum, while the identification of a firm’s competitive strategy at the micro level 
is not without its problems, the classification approach used in this section clearly 
illustrates one point. Patterns in the strategies of pharmaceutical firms are strikingly 
homogenous in Italy, Germany, and the UK alike.
4 Final assessments
But to what extent do firms in different political economies vary in their pursuit of 
competitive strategies? Does the above micro-level identification of competitive 
strategies support the convergence argument of the competitiveness literature, which 
has thus far mostly been corroborated through macro-level indicators? Do firms in 
the UK converge on the pursuit of an RPI strategy, whereas German companies 
pursue a DQP strategy, while their Italian counterparts engage mostly in LCP? 
Table 4 summarizes the results obtained from sampling the PHID database22 and 
negates the idea that the majority of firms in one economy specialize in the same 
strategy. Instead, table 4 shows that firms in Germany, Italy, and the UK pursue 
RPI, DQP, and LCP strategies to a similar extent. While 47.5  % of pharmaceutical 
firms in the UK are RPI strategists, 39.4 % of firms pursue this strategy in Germany 
and 34.5 % of their counterparts do so in Italy. A DQP strategy is pursued by 51.5 % 
of German firms, 37.9 % of Italian firms, and 42.5 % of British firms. Finally, the 
probability that firms engage in LCP is 27.6 % in Italy, 10.0 % in the UK, and 9.1 % 
in Germany. Thus, even though the share of firms engaged in the same strategy 
varies slightly from one economy to another, it is not drastically different between 
the countries considered.
Nevertheless, slight convergence patterns can be observed. Table 4 accordingly 
reports the average probability with which firms in Germany, Italy, and the UK 
pursue RPI, DQP, or LCP strategies. Interestingly, British firms are 6.3 % more 
likely to engage in radical product innovation than the average pharmaceutical firm 
22 The nine firms which pursue both an RPI and a DQP strategy are counted as two cases each.
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included in the sample. Similarly, the probability of pursuing a DQP strategy is 
7.4 % higher for a German firm than for the sample’s average company. Finally, 
Italian firms show a preference for low cost production, as they pursue this strategy 
12.9 % more often than the average pharmaceutical company. British companies 
thus seem to prefer RPI, German firms DQP, and Italian firms LCP strategy.
Does this finding suggest that firms in one economy converge on the institutionally 
supported strategy because a plurality, rather than the majority, pursues this strategic 
approach? This idea would be supported empirically if the observed convergence 
patterns were pronounced enough to provide statistically significant results. A cross-
tab analysis assessing the strength of association between a firm’s country and its 
strategy offers insights. The results obtained reveal that the modest convergence 
patterns observed in table 4 are not statistically significant, which is true for both 
the χ² value (χ² = 5.996; 2 cells = 22.2 % with expected count less than 5; p = 
.199) and the value of Cramer’s V (Cramer’s V = .171; p = .199).23 Hence, the 
identification of competitive strategies through micro-level indicators does not lend 
empirical support to the idea that a plurality of pharmaceutical firms within the 
same economy converge on the same strategy.
What are we to think about these results? How are the above micro-level findings 
compatible with the convergence argument of the competitiveness literature based 
on macro-level analyses? Ever since the seminal article of Robinson (1950; see also 
Coleman 1986, 1990), social scientists are warned not to test theories about micro-
level relationships on the basis of macro-level data, as the discrepancies between 
correlations of micro-level indicators and their aggregation at the macro level are 
substantial. The reason is that, depending on the array rules employed, important 
information on individual cases is lost when the latter are aggregated at a higher 
level. This causes correlations of aggregated indicators to deliver stronger results 
23 The full documentation of the abovementioned and all following cross-tab analyses can be ob-
tained from the author upon request.
Table 4 Summary results: RPI, DQP, and LCP strategists in the UK, Germany, and Italy  
 (excluding generics firms)
Radical product 
innovators
Diversified quality 
producers
Low cost  
producers
Total
No. firms  % firms No. firms  % firms No. firms  % firms No. firms  % firms
UK 19 47.5 17 42.5 4 10.0  40 39.2
Germany  13  39.4  17  51.5  3  9.1  33  32.4
Italy  10  34.5  11  37.9  8  27.6  29  28.4
Total  42  45  15 102 100.0
Average  14  41.2  15  44.1  5  14.7  34
Above 
average
 
 6.3
 
 7.4
 
 12.9
Source: PHID database (November 2004).
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than correlations of the same, disaggregated measures. The higher the level of data 
aggregation, the less representative are macro-level correlations of micro-level 
effects (Feige/Watts 1972).
A similar argument seems to explain why the above convergence effects are weak 
compared to the convergence effects revealed by the competitiveness literature.24 
Whenever a firm’s strategy is identified through a macro-level indicator, e.g. its 
industry, less information on each individual case is preserved than when the 
firm’s strategy is identified through micro-level measures, such as product novelty 
and value-chain focus. This loss of information seems to explain why strategy 
convergence is stronger when measured by a macro indicator. Imagine that a firm’s 
industry had been taken as a proxy for its strategy, so that all biotech firms were 
identified as radical product innovators and all traditional pharmaceutical firms as 
diversified quality producers. Then the sample obtained from the PHID database, 
as summarized in table 5, would tell a different story about strategy convergence, 
namely that 62.2 % of British firms converge in the pursuit of RPI strategies, while 
65.5 % of German and even 88.5 % of Italian pharmaceutical firms converge in 
DQP strategies.
Contrary to the results of the above cross-tab analysis, an assessment of the 
strength of association between a firm’s country and its strategy identified by the 
firms’ industry reveals that the observed convergence patterns are statistically 
significant.25 Accordingly, both χ² (= 16.814; 0 cells = 0 % with expected count less 
than 5; p < .001) and Cramer’s V (= .428; p < .001) assume comparatively high 
and statistically significant values. Thus, as soon as a firm’s industry is taken as a 
proxy for its competitive strategy, strong convergence effects are revealed which, in 
24 For examples, see Porter (1990: 179–541); Keck (1993); Walker (1993); Pavitt/Patel (1999); Hall/
Soskice (2001a: 36–44); Amable (2003); Hancké/Herrmann (2007).
25 The nine traditional pharmaceutical firms, which were previously identified as RPI and DQP 
strategists, are now counted as only one case each, following the strategy-identification ap-
proach taken by most competitiveness scholars.
Table 5 Summary results: Biotechnology and Traditional Pharmaceutical Firms in the UK,   
 Germany, and Italy
Biotechnology firms Traditional pharma. firms Total
No. firms    % firms No. firms    % firms No. firms    % firms
UK 23 62.2 14 37.8 37 40.2
Germany 10 34.5 19 65.5 29 31.5
Italy 3 11.5 23 88.5 26 28.3
Total 36 56 92 100.0
Average 12 39.1 18.67 60.9 30.67
Above 
average
 
23.1
  
27.6
Source: PHID database (November 2004).
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turn, provides empirical support for the competitiveness literature’s argument that 
national institutions have a strong impact on the strategy choices of firms.
It is a pity for the sake of this argument that the PHID database does not include 
generics firms (see section 3). Attempting to evaluate how the inclusion of these low 
cost producers might affect the previous strategy convergence patterns, I looked for 
other data sources that reveal how many generics firms with a clear national scope 
were active in the UK, Germany, and Italy at the start of the new millennium.26 The 
generics outlook by Wittner (2003) provides a particularly useful source, as it is 
written at about the same time I sampled the PHID database. Unfortunately, though, 
the generics outlook only offers an up-to-date overview of all then active generics 
firms, whereas the PHID database covers a 20-year time span of pharmaceutical 
firms that have been involved in a pharmaceutical project which reached the stage of 
preclinical development. Furthermore, of the generics firms identified in Wittner’s 
report at the start of the millennium, only two British,27 three German,28 and one 
Italian29 generics producer had not been acquired by a foreign holding company at 
the start of 2008 (see Wittner 2003: 51–54, 70–73, 133–134).
This consolidation of national generics firms (see Wittner 2005) seems to reflect 
the increased vulnerability to change on the part of LCP strategies. The reasons are 
twofold. First, the absence of radical or incremental innovation as a source of value 
added means that profit margins are small, while price competition is high. As soon 
as LCP strategists come under financial pressure, they are particularly susceptible 
to takeover or bankruptcy because additional expenses cannot be covered by 
proportionate price increases (see Läsker 2005). Second, takeovers of LCP firms are 
easier than those of R&D intensive firms because technological barriers are lower 
(see Schröder 2004). In order to achieve the necessary economies of scale, mergers 
and acquisitions are thus the order of the day in the generics industry (see Wittner 
2005). The greater instability of LCP might also explain why the two more recent 
strands of the competitiveness literature, i.e. theories on national innovation systems 
and on varieties of capitalism, focus on the importance of national institutions 
for RPI and DQP, rather than LCP, strategies. In other words, differences in the 
propensity of RPI, DQP, and LCP strategies to change make comparison inherently 
difficult, which is particularly true for studies of generics firms, as comparable data 
cannot be obtained from the PHID database.
That said, it is nevertheless worth exploring how the PHID sample changes when 
the six aforementioned generics firms are added – even though this does not 
26 According to the approach used by the PHID database, a generics firm is said to have a national 
scope if it has its headquarters in, and concentrates its activities on, the national territory of the 
same country.
27 Namely Kent Pharmaceuticals and Tillomed Laboratories.
28 These are Aliud Pharma, CT Arzneimittel, and Stada Arzneimittel.
29 Namely DOC Generici.
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profoundly alter the previous results. To begin with, it is revealing that generics 
producers were, and continue to be, active in the UK, Germany, and Italy alike. 
Consequently, the strategy convergence patterns observed in table 4 become even 
less distinct when generics producers are added (see table A.1 reproduced in the 
technical appendix). It is thus hardly surprising that a cross-tab analysis of the firms’ 
country and competitive strategies shows these modest convergence patterns not to 
be statistically significant,30 which, again, challenges the convergence argument of 
the competitiveness literature.
However, as soon as the industry of firms is taken as a macro-level indicator of their 
competitive strategy (see table A.2 of the technical appendix), cross-tab analyses 
reveal statistically significant convergence patterns.31 Given that British, German, 
and Italian firms vary only modestly in their generics activities, the statistical 
significance results from the pronounced engagement of British pharmaceutical 
firms in biotechnology activities, while German and Italian firms are predominantly 
active in the traditional pharmaceutical sector. Yet, this macro-level assessment of 
competitive strategies also entails the simplifying assumption that all firms in one 
industry pursue the same competitive strategy. All biotech firms engaged in DQP 
and all traditional pharmaceutical firms pursuing RPI or LCP strategies are ignored. 
It is this loss of information on micro-level variety that enables the competitiveness 
literature to identify convergence trends due to the use of macro-level indicators.
5 Conclusion and outlook for future research
The previous assessment of whether firms in different economies converge in 
the pursuit of one competitive strategy has illustrated one crucial point. Whether 
or not statistically significant convergence patterns are observed depends on the 
sophistication of the strategy measures employed. The widely diffused approach 
of competitiveness scholars of identifying competitive strategies through macro-
level indicators based on the industries of different firms yields strong convergence 
results. Importantly, though, this approach entails the simplifying assumption that 
all firms within the same industry pursue the same competitive strategy. The more 
fine-grained indicator used here, combining the technological novelty of a firm’s 
products and its value-chain focus, has shown however that firms within the same 
industry can pursue different strategies. And, as soon as this indicator, capturing 
richer micro-level information, is employed, the previously strong convergence 
30 χ² = 3.643 (0 cells = 0 % with expected count less than 5); p = .457. Cramer’s V = .130; p = 
.457
31 χ² = 18.037 (3 cells = 33.3 % with expected count less than 5); p < .01. Cramer’s V = .303; p < 
.01
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results are seen to be decisively more modest and, even, statistically insignificant. 
In other words, the loss of information that is related to the use of macro-level 
indictors seems to explain why competitiveness scholars find strong effects of 
strategy convergence within the same economy.
What does this finding teach us about the viability of the RBV approach, on the 
one hand, and the competitiveness literature, on the other? To be clear, the analyses 
of this paper do not show that national institutions are of no relevance to firms. On 
the contrary; national institutions possibly explain an essential part of industrial 
development, e.g. why the biotechnology industry is more developed in the UK 
than in other European countries. Crucially, though, the above analyses alert us 
not to confuse the expansion of industries with the corporate choices made over 
competitive strategies. If at all, a firm’s industry seems to be a very crude measure 
of its competitive strategy. Consequently, the findings of this paper challenge one 
of the core arguments of the competitiveness literature: that firms (start to) compete 
through the same strategy in response to globalization. Second, it indicates why 
the convergence effects revealed by this literature are, maybe overly, pronounced: 
because the use of macro-level indicators for competitive strategies could well 
miss important micro-level information. However, what the previous results do not 
teach us is: how firms can so numerously compete through strategies that are not 
supported by national institutions?
To be clear, it is less surprising that firms within one economy, and even within one 
industry, engage in different strategies. In order to gain a competitive advantage, they 
need to distinguish themselves from other firms through having a better strategy. 
Each firm needs to do something different from its competitors so as to produce 
either newer, better, or cheaper products. However, one puzzle that remains to be 
solved by future research is how firms can pursue diverse strategies. Can the RBV 
approach offer the advice that, in order to pursue the same strategy, firms can randomly 
employ different types of a single input factor, as long as the latter is turned into 
a valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and strategically non-substitutable resource 
(Barney 1991)? Does a systematic approach for such transformation procedures 
exist? Or is the competitiveness literature nevertheless able to provide answers? 
Do firms need specific types of a single input factor to pursue a given strategy? 
And, if so, how can firms secure the required factor types in those economies where 
they are not provided by national institutions? The present article can thus be no 
more than the beginning of a broader analysis of how firms cope with increasing 
pressures for competitiveness in the wake of globalization.
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Technical Appendix
Table A.1 Summary results: RPI, DQP, and LCP strategists in the UK, Germany, and Italy  
 (including generics firms)
Radical Product 
Innovators
Diversified Quality 
Producers
Low Cost Producers Total
No. firms  % firms No. firms  % firms No. firms  % firms No. firms  % firms
UK 19 45.0 17 40.0 6 15.0 42 38.9
Germany 13 36.1 17 47.2 6 16.7 36 33.3
Italy 10 33.3 11 36.7 9 30.0 30 27.8
Total 42 45 21 108 100.0
Average 14 38.9 15 41.7 7 19.4 36
Above 
average
 
 6.1
 
 5.5
 
 10.6
Source: PHID database (November 2004) and Wittner (2003: 51–54, 70–73, 133–134).
Table A.2 Summary results: Biotechnology, traditional pharmaceutical, and generics firms in the UK,   
 Germany, and Italy
Biotechnology  
firms
Traditional  
pharma. firms
Generics Total
No. firms  % firms No. firms  % firms No. firms  % firms No. firms  % firms
UK 23 59.0 14 35.9 2 5.1 39 39.8
Germany 10 31.3 19 59.4 3 9.3 32 32.7
Italy 3 11.1 23 85.2 1 3.7 27 27.6
Total 36 56 6 98 100.0
Average 12 36.7 18.67 57.2 2 6.1 32.67
Above 
average
 
22.3
  
28.0
  
3.2
Source: PHID database (November 2004) and Wittner (2003: 51–54, 70–73, 133–134).
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